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I. INTRODUCTION
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia highlights some problems
that arise when the ostensibly simple principle that host-state consent
is necessary for U.N. peacekeeping is put into practice. The difficulty of applying this principle, especially when no generally recognized government has effective control of the entirety of a state's territory, is discussed elsewhere in this Symposium. 2 Such a division of
effective control existed in the former Yugoslavia and was compounded by the lack of clarity and consensus in the Security Council
mandates which authorize military intervention?
The following account of events in the former Yugoslavia is
partly a description of the difficulties that arose there and partly a
demonstration that the notion of consent in this context is a complex
one. This examination of efforts to reach agreement on foreign military presence reveals that the issue of consent arose at several different times and in different forms. In Part II below, the various forms
of consent are discussed-not only is initial consent to the establishment of a force required, but consent to the scope of its mandate and
to the composition of its forces is also sought. Obtaining this formal
consent to deployment of an armed force is only the starting point of
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1. On host-state consent in general, see Davis Brown, The Role of the United Nations in
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2. See generally Wippman, MilitaryIntervention, supranote 1.
3. See generally Mats L Berdal, The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict After
the Cold War, 7 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 71 (1996) (discussing the latter problem in detail).
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a peacekeeping operation. Thereafter, consent to detailed rules on
the rights of the peacekeeping force by means of a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) allows the force to assert its rights against a recalcitrant host state. Difficulties in securing SOFAs in the former
Yugoslavia are discussed in Part III.
In complex peacekeeping operations, the perception of what
mandate is necessary to bring about resolution of the conflict often
changes. Changes to the initial mandate for the peacekeeping force
in the former Yugoslavia are discussed in detail in Part IV. Regardless of what formal agreements are concluded, it is cooperation on
the ground that is crucial to the success of a peacekeeping mission.
Where this is not forthcoming the Security Council may turn to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to make stronger the obligation to
comply with its resolutions and to cooperate with the peacekeeping
force; this practice is discussed in Part V.
Such references to Chapter VII, of course, do not alter the fact
that the presence of the peacekeeping force still depends on hoststate consent. Moreover, efforts to obtain consent, and even references to Chapter VII, were not enough to ensure cooperation by the
parties in the former Yugoslavia with the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR), since the parties saw UNPROFOR as an obstacle in the way of a favorable military solution rather than as an
impartial force. This failure to ensure cooperation and reach agreement with respect to the mandate and status of U.N. forces led to the
activation of a Rapid Reaction Force, discussed in Part VI, and ultimately to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia and to the
establishment of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), discussed in Part VII.
As the world community witnessed in the case of the former
Yugoslavia, sometimes the inherent limitations on a peacekeeping
force, including the legal requirement of host-state consent and the
practical requirement of cooperation from all significant parties involved, are at odds with expectations for what the U.N. force might
achieve. U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, well aware
of the resulting political difficulties, reaffirmed the appropriate role
of a peacekeeping force when he welcomed Croatian President
Tudjman's announcement that he would accept the establishment of
UNCRO in Croatia:
As the Council is considering the question of maintaining a U.N.
peacekeeping presence in Croatia, it is timely for me to restate the
basic principles of such a presence. A U.N. peacekeeping force can
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operate effectively only with the consent and full cooperation of
the parties. It is an interim measure whose purpose is to help the
parties to find a durable peace based on agreement between the
parties themselves. It is not intended nor equipped to impose a
solution on the parties.4
II. INITIAL CONSENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
DEPLOYMENT OF UNPROFOR
A. Consent to Establishment and Deployment
The statement that host-state consent is necessary for U.N.
peacekeeping is usually made in the context of the establishment and
deployment of the peacekeeping force. In the past it has generally,
and not surprisingly, been assumed that the necessary consent is that
of the host-state government. Recently certain writers have tried to
challenge the orthodoxy, at least with regard to what the law should
be.5 However, events in Yugoslavia tend to confirm the traditional
position.
Certain points emerge from an examination of the initial consent
to the deployment of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. First,
the Security Council resolutions and the Secretary-General's reports
on Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina refer to the consent of all concerned parties, not simply of the host state. This was consistent with
the Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace where he said that the consent of "all the parties concerned" in a conflict is necessary to establish a peacekeeping force.6 Further, the practice of referring to the
consent of all the parties in the Yugoslav conflict follows, to some extent, earlier practices in Angola,7 Namibia,s Cambodia and Mozam-

4. Report of the Secretary-GeneralSubmitted Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 994, U.N.

SCOR, 50th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doe. S/1995/467 (1995) [hereinafter S/1995/467].
5. See, e-g., Wippman, MilitaryIntervention, supranote 1, at 224-34. For the opposing view, see
Georg Nolte, RestoringPeace by Regional Action: InternationalLegal Aspects of the Liberian Conflict,
53 ZETSCHRir FRAusLANDIscHms OFFNTIcHEs RECHT UND V6LKERREcHT 603 (1993).
6. Further Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 721, U.N.

SCOR, 47th Sess., at 2, U.N. Do. S/23513 (1992) [hereinafter S/23513]; See also Further Report of the
Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 721, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 6, U.N. Doe.
S23363 (1992) [hereinafter S/23363]; Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Security Council
Resolution 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doe. S/23280 (1991) [hereinafter Sf23280].

7. In Angola, a trilateral agreement among Angola, Cuba and South Africa led to the establishment
of a United Nations force. See UNITED NATIONs DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE BLUE
HELMETS: A REvIEW OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 325-38, U.N. Doe. DP111065, U.N. Sales No.
E.90.L18 (1990) [hereinafter THE BLUE HELMETS]. Resolution 626, establishing UNAVEM, noted Ango-
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bique" where U.N. peacekeeping operations were created in order to
help secure a political settlement for civil conflicts. Of these operations, however, it was only with reference to Mozambique that a Security Council resolution expressly referred to consent by a nongovernment party to the conflict to establishing a peacekeeping
force." In Somalia it was the consent of the government, even
though it was no longer in effective control of the whole territory,
that was relied on in the Security Council resolutions establishing and
deploying the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)
peacekeeping force.'2
It seems clear that the requirement that all the parties should
consent to the establishment and deployment of the force was not a
legal requirement. Rather, it was only the host state's consent, as expressed by its government, that formed the legal basis for the
peacekeeping force first in Yugoslavia and subsequently in its former
republics. 3 This can be seen from the fact that later in the Yugoslav
conflict it was the withdrawal of consent by the government of the
host state Croatia that meant the peacekeeping force had to be withIan and Cuban requests for a U.N. force. See LetterDated 17 December 1988from the PermanentRepresentative of Cuba to the UnitedNationsAddressed to the Secretary General,U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/20337 (1988); Letter Dated 17 December 1988from the PermanentRepresentative of Angola to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 43rd Sess., U.N. Doc. 8/20336
(1988).
8.The situation in Namibia was unique because of the U.N.'s legal responsibility for Namibia,
which was effectively but illegally occupied by South Africa. See THE BLUE HELMETS, supra note 7, at
341. The U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), whose mandate was to ensure the early independence ofNamibia through U.N.-supervised elections, was established following a trilateral agreement among
Angola, Cuba and South Africa (referred to in Resolution 628). The South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), a major political party in Namibia, was not a party to these Geneva Protocols of August
1988, which provided for a ceasefire. However SWAPO did inform the Secretary-General that it would
abide by the ceasefire. See i.
9. After the four Cambodian parties in the civil war had made a draft agreement for a comprehensive political settlement and had created a Supreme National Council, the President of the Council invited
the United Nations to send peacekeeping forces to Cambodia. See UNrr NAnoNS AND CAMBODIA at 6364, U.N. Doc. DP1I1450, U.N. Sales No. E.95.19 (1995). Security Council Resolution 717, establishing an
advance U.N. mission (UNAMIC), expressly referred to this invitation. Id.
10. After the government and the opposing side, RENAMO, concluded a general peace agreement,
the government formally requested the establishment of a U.N. force. Security Council Resolution 782
also expressly referred to a joint declaration by the government and RENAMO accepting the creation and
deployment of a U.N. force. S.C. Res. 782, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/782 (1992). Resolution 797 subsequently established the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ). S.C. Res.
797, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES797 (1992).
11. See id.
12. S.C. Res. 775, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doec. S/RES/775 (1992); S.C. Res 767, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doec. S/RES/767 (1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, U.N.
Doec. S/RES/751 (1992); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doec. S/RESn/33 (1992).
13. Seesupra note 5.
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drawn from its territory. 14 The consent of other parties involved in
the conflict is important as a matter of practical necessity. The
peacekeeping force would not be able to function without the cooperation of the parties on the ground.
It would, however, be going too far to assert that existing international law already looks beyond the government to groups within
the state for consent to U.N. intervention, even if the government no
longer has control over the whole territory.' Requiring consent by
all the parties may be a practical policy at the stage of initial consent,
and one that increases the chances of success of the peacekeeping
operation. However, as recounted below, subsequent developments
in Yugoslavia with regard to changes in the mandate, questions of
composition, and the withdrawal of consent show the Security Council and Secretary-General consistently giving decisive weight to the
wishes of the governments of Croatia and of Bosnia-Herzegovina
rather than to other parties involved in the conflict.
The Security Council made the controversial decision to send a
peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia after much hesitation and extensive consultation. It asked the Secretary-General to investigate the
prospects for successful deployment of a peacekeeping force. In his
reports to the Security Council, the Secretary-General repeatedly insisted that he needed the full and explicit acceptance by the parties
directly involved of the concept for a U.N. peacekeeping operation,
and a commitment on their part to ensure full cooperation with such
a peacekeeping force." He emphasized the need for all the Yugoslav
parties concerned to consent to the establishment and deployment of
the force. 7
At first the prospects for consent looked promising. The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in November 1991 that
each of the Yugoslav participants had stated that they wanted to see
the deployment of a peacekeeping operation as soon as possible, and
that they welcomed the concept of the operation, its mandate, its organization and the areas where it would be deployed, put forward in
preliminary form by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy. 8 These
14. See infra Part VII
15. Some, however, have asserted that this ought to be the case. See, e.g., Wippman, MilitaryIntervention, supranote 1,at 224-34.
16. See S/23513, supranote 6, at 2; 5t23363, supranote 6, at 6; S/23280, supranote 6, at 7.
17. S/23513, supranote 6, at 2.
18. Letter Dated24 November 1991 from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Presidentof the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doe. S/23239 (1991).
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'participants' at a series of meetings to discuss the deployment of
peacekeeping forces were President Milosevic of Serbia, President
Tudjman of Croatia, and General Kadijevic, Secretary of State for
National Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The statement by the Secretary-General that the participants had
consented was followed by a letter from the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to the Security Council formally requesting the establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia. It read, "I have
been instructed by my Government to request the establishment of a
peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia which reflects at the same
time the expressed desire of the principal parties to the present con'
flict."19
The Security Council in Resolution 721 explicitly took account of these expressions of consent in urging the Secretary-General
to continue to pursue the possible establishment of a peacekeeping
force."' It said,
Consideringthe request by the Government of Yugoslavia for the
establishment of a peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia,
Consideringfurther the fact that each one of the Yugoslav participants in the meeting with the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-

General stated that they wanted to see the deployment of a U.N.
peacekeeping operation as soon as possible .....
Following these statements, problems over consent began to
emerge. The Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council under Resolution 721, from December 1991 to February 1992, refer to
difficulties in obtaining and keeping the consent to the U.N.
peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia of Milan Babic, a leader of the
Serbian community in Croatia, and of President Tudjman of Croatia." All concerned Yugoslav parties had indicated full acceptance of
the U.N. peacekeeping concept, but there had been recent public
statements by some of the leaders suggesting that further clarification
was needed. Babic was unhappy with any reference to the U.N.
peacekeeping forces operating in protected areas "in Croatia" as he
sought independence for the Serb-populated areas. President Tudjman was not willing to accept arrangements that seemed to take con19. Letter Dated 26 of November 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia to the
United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 1, U.N.
Doe. St23240 (1991).
20. S.C. Res. 721, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doe. S/RES/721 (1991) (passed unanimously).
21. Id.
22. See S/23513,supra note 6, at 5; Sf23363, supranote 6, at 5; S/23280, supranote 6, at 5.
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trol of local government and public order in the proposed U.N.protected areas in Croatia out of Croatia's authority.'
After the Secretary-General had reported these problems over
consent, President Tudjman wrote to the Security Council on February 6, 1992. His letter read, "In order to avoid any misunderstanding
I inform you that I accept, fully and unconditionally, the United Nations Secretary-General's concept and plan which defines the condi-24
tions and areas where the United Nations force would be deployed.,
Security Council Resolution 740 noted this:
[T]aking note that the letter of President Franjo Tudjman of 6 February 1992, in which he accepts fully the Secretary-General's concept and plan which defines the conditions and areas where the
U.N. force would be deployed, removes a further obstacle in that
respect... expresses its concern that the U.N. peacekeeping plan
has not yet been fully and unconditionally accepted by all in Yugoslavia on whose cooperation its success depends.25
However, President Tudjman subsequently equivocated about
his consent in such a way as to cast doubt on the validity of his commitment. The Secretary-General's Special Envoy, Cyrus Vance,
wrote expressing dismay and seeking reassurance. 26 President Tudjman reconfirmed his acceptance, but in distinctly ominous terms.
President Tudjman stated that the U.N. peace plan envisaged status
of forces agreements and that these would have to resolve what he
referred to as "technical questions" such as matters to do with traffic,
trade, banking, currency, the maintenance of law and order, and the
return of refugees.' However, as the Secretary-General pointed out,
these were not in fact technical issues. Rather they were substantive
matters relating to the extension of Croatia's sovereignty over U.N.protected areas. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General said he would
accept in good faith President Tudjman's positive assurances, and
similarly would discount Babic's resistance.28 He therefore recommended the establishment of UNPROFOR. Its initial mandate was

23. See S/23513, supranote 6, at 5.
24. Further Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Security Council Resolution 721, U.N.

SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/23592 (1992) [hereinafter S/23592].
25. S.C. Res. 740, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/740 (1992) (passed unanimously).
26. See S/23592, supranote 24, at Annex IL
27. See id. at Annex 111.
28. Seeid.at3.
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to "create the conditions of peace and security required
29 for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.,
The Secretary-General did note the potential danger to the implementation of the peacekeeping plan and these fears turned out to
be justified. When the conflict in Yugoslavia threatened to spread to
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the government of Bosnia repeatedly requested
the establishment of a U.N. force.31 The Secretary-General again investigated the feasibility of deploying such a force and, as with Croatia, repeatedly stressed the need for the agreement of all the hostile
parties.32 This was eventually given in a limited form when the parties came to a ceasefire agreement in June 1992. The agreement included a provision that UNPROFOR would be deployed in Bosnia33
Herzegovina in order to secure the operation of Sarajevo airport.
The Security Council noted in Resolution 758, which enlarged the
strength and mandate of UNPROFOR to allow it to deploy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, "the agreement of all the parties in BosniaHerzegovina to the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian
purposes, under the exclusive authority of the United Nations, and
with the assistance of UNPROFOR."3' With regard to Macedonia,
the process of establishing consent to the deployment of
UNPROFOR as a preventive force proved more straightforward. In
November 1992, the government of Macedonia made a request to the
Security Council for the deployment of UNPROFOR on its territory. This request was acknowledged in Security Council Resolution 79536 and a small force was deployed inside its borders with Albania and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the preventive
mandate of monitoring any developments which could undermine
stability. 37
29. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. $/RES1743 (1992) (passed unanimously).
30. See S/23592, supra note 24, at 3.
31. See FurtherReportof the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security CouncilResolution 749, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doe. Sf23900 (1992) [hereinafter S/23900]; Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 749, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doe. S/23836 (1992)
hereinafter S/23836]; S/23363, supranote 6,at 4.
32. See Sf23900, supranote 31, at 8; Sf23836, supranote 31, at 6.
33. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 757, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doe. S/24075 (1992).
34. S.C. Res. 758, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doe. S/RES1758 (1992) (passed unanimously).
35. Letter Dated 23 November 1992from the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Presidentof the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/24851 (1992).
36. S.C. Res. 795, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doe. S/RES/795 (1992).
37. See Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doe. S/24923 (1992).
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B. Consent to Mandate
It is also clear from the negotiations between the parties and the
Secretary-General leading up to the creation of UNPROFOR and its
deployment in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia that
consent is sought by the United Nations not just for establishment of
the force, but also for the details of its mandate. Thus, in Croatia detailed discussions were held on the U.N. peace plan and on the exact
regime in the U.N.-protected Areas." Again, with regard to BosniaHerzegovina the conflicting parties were involved in working out the
precise mandate of UNPROFOR.39
C. Consent to Composition
The question of consent to the composition of the peacekeeping
force has given rise to debate as to who has the final say in determining the nationality of the troops of the force. The issue whether
the host state, the Security Council or the Secretary-General has the
final say arose with regard to the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) in the Middle East and the United Nations Operation in the
Congo (ONUC).4' In both these instances, the host state tried to assert control but was resisted by the United Nations. It seems, as a
matter of principle, that the United Nations itself, through whatever
organ has established the peacekeeping force, should determine the
composition of the force. Any other solution would be incompatible
with the impartial status of the force. However, it is clear that, in reality, behind-the-scenes discussions take place between members of
the Security Council, the host state and troop contributing states.
This pattern was followed again in the former Yugoslavia.
In Yugoslavia, the issue of composition did not give rise to much
public discussion. The more serious problem was getting hold of any
troops at all, rather than the question of the troops' nationality.41 Although in the Conceptfor a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation
in Yugoslavia the Secretary-General recommended that "[t]he contributing states would be approved on the recommendation of the

38. See S/23592, supranote 24; S/23513, supra note 6; S/23363, supra note 6; S/23280, supra note

6.
39. See S/23900, supranote 31; see also 1992 U.N.Y.B. 349, U.N. Sales No. E.93.11.
40. See IHIGGINS, supranote 1, at 367-68; 3 HIGGINS, supranote 1, at 135.

41. See, eg., Report ofthe Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Resolution 844 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 49th
Sess., U.N. Doe. Sf1994/555 (1994); Former Yugoslavia: IncreasedSanctions Weighed, U.N. CHRON.,
Dec. 1994, at, 26,27; Yugoslavia: SituationFarFrom Stable, U.N. CHRON., June 1994, at 22,26.
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Secretary-General after consultation with the Yugoslav parties,"42
such approval, if it was sought and given, seems to have taken place
mainly in private. The early U.N. practice of not accepting troops
from the permanent members of the Security Council or from states
with interests in the host state43 was not followed in Yugoslavia.
Troops were supplied by the United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany and Turkey among others. The question of the nationality of
peacekeeping troops was not raised publicly by any host state (except
in passing and informally in the notorious episode when a Croatian
official responsible for relations with the U.N. called for "all'European' forces").' Other concerned parties did, however, express
some reservations about the composition of the force. For example,
the participation by troops from Turkey, a state with historic interests
in the region and sympathies with the government of BosniaHerzegovina, was challenged when Turkish troops were sent to
UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1994. The SecretaryGeneral had recommended that Turkey's offer to contribute be accepted45 and the Security Council concurred." The Bosnian Serbs expressed concern,47 Greece and Bulgaria wrote to the Security Council
in opposition,' and Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) also complained, stating that
[t]he complex nature of the civil, inter-ethnic and religious conflict
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its deep historical roots and underlying
causes make it necessary that no former occupying power of the
territories of the former Yugoslavia or any neighbouring state
should be involved with their forces in peacekeeping efforts ....
Though it is commendable that the United Nations has so far respected the historical sensitivities on the ground, it is indeed dis-

42. S/23280, supranote 6, at 15.
43. See generally Sally Morphet, U.N. PeacekeepingandElection-Monitoring,in UNITED NATIONS,
DIVIDED WORLDS 183, 187-88 (Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed., 1993); BROWN, supra
note 1,at 599. For comparison, see I HIGGINS, supra note 1,at 300; 3 HIGGINS, supra note 1, at 84; 4
HIGGINS, supra note 1,at 159 (noting that this practice of avoiding participation by the permanent members of the Security Council in peacekeeping forces had already been abandoned in Cyprus and Lebanon).
44. CroatianCallForAll-'European'Force,News DigestforApril 1995,41 KEESING'S RECORD OF
WORLD EVENTs 40512 (1995).
145. "See Letter Dated 22 March 1994, from the Secretary-General Addresed to the President if the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/1994/330 (1994).
46. See Letter Dated 23 March 1994 firom the Presidentof the Security Council Addressed to the
Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 1,U.N. Doc. S/1994/331 (1994).
47. See UN CallFor Troop Reinforcements-UK Response-PlannedDespatch of Turkish Contingent,News DigestforMarch 1994,40 KEEsNG'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 39, 926 (1994).

48. See id.
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turbing that these basic principles of peacekeeping have now been
disregarded and that the United Nations has succumbed to pressure
to engage a Turkish force within UNPROFOR. 49
Later, when Germany contributed troops to UNPROFOR in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1995, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) again protested partly because of German involvement in the
region during World War II and because Germany was seen as favoring the Croats."0 Yugoslavia said that the participation by Germany provoked understandable disquiet and serious concern." This
marked yet another breach of the United Nations' principle that
neighbouring states which had occupied territory of the former
Yugoslavia in the past should not contribute to troops there. 2
III. CONSENT AND COOPERATION: THE PROBLEMS IN
SECURING STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS
The Secretary-General made it clear from the outset that it was
not enough merely to secure formal consent of the parties to the establishment and deployment of UNPROFOR; promises of cooperation with the U.N. force were also needed. 3 This cooperation requirement can be seen as a necessary extension of the principle of
consent. Based on the principles of effectiveness and good faith, consent should not be interpreted as a purely formal requirement. Given
that host-state consent means that the host state has agreed to the
presence and mandate of U.N. forces, consent by the host state also
necessarily implies that it has undertaken to cooperate with those
forces.
In the former Yugoslavia lack of cooperation was the main factor that made it impossible for UNPROFOR to fulfil its mandate.
One aspect of the parties' reluctance to give real cooperation was the
delay or outright refusal of host states to conclude SOFAs with
UNPROFOR. Such agreements govern the rights, duties, and privileges and immunities of U.N. forces and are commonly concluded
49. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3370th mtg., at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3370 (1994); see also U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., at2, U.N. Doc. S/1994/350 (1994).
50. This information was obtained from a confidential British government document which refers

to a Public Statement of Foreign Ministry of Yugoslavia on June 30, 1995. Further details can be obtained by contacting the author.

51. See id.
52. See Provision of Artillery to UNPROFOR-Vote to Deploy German Forces,News Digestfor

June 1995, 41 KEESiNG'S RECORD OF WORLD EvENTs 40607 (1995).
53. See Wippman, MilitaryIntervention, supranote 1.
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with host states.- In 1990, at the request of the General Assembly,
the Secretary-General produced a Model SOFA. The Model SOFA
provided for freedom of movement and freedom of communication
for U.N. forces, prohibited the imposition of tolls for roads, bridges,
canals, ports and airfields, allowed the import of materiel for the
U.N. force free of duty and provided for the freedom to recruit local
personnel without government interference.5 In an ideal world, it
would be compulsory for a SOFA to be approved by a host state before a U.N. peacekeeping force could be deployed. However, owing
to the realities of international politics, such approval is not compulsory. For example, in Yugoslavia, the United Nations was only able
to receive equivocal consent from the host state; it would not have
been possible for the United Nations to receive approval for a SOFA
from the host state as well.
At the beginning of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the
Secretary-General was optimistic about prospects for the conclusion
of such SOFAs. In April 1992, he reported that the final text of an
agreement had been agreed to by Bosnia-Herzegovina, a tentative
agreement had been reached with Croatia, and protracted negotiations were being conducted with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He said that the primary difficulties related to the provision of
goods and services to UNPROFOR by the various Yugoslav parties
either free of charge or on the most favorable terms.56 In fact, the
agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina was not concluded until May
1993."7 No agreement was made with Croatia on UNPROFOR, although Croatia did conclude an agreement on the successor to
UNPROFOR in Croatia, UNCRO" Further, no agreement was
concluded with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) 9 A SOFA was
54. See I HiGINs, supranote 1,at 372; Morphet, supranote 43, at 187-88.
55. See ComprehensiveReview of the Whole Question of PeacekeepingOperations in All TheirAspects, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., at 5,7, Agenda Item 76, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990)
56. See Further Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Security Council Resolution 749
(1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., at 2-3, U.N. Doe. 8/23844 (1992) [hereinafter S/23844].
57. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., para. 56, U.N. Doc. S/1995/222 (1995) [hereinafter S/1995/222].
58. See S/1995/467, supranote 4, at 5.
59. See S/1995/222, supranote 57, para. 58. The Secretary-General reported in March 1995 that no
progress had been made on the conclusion of the necessary arrangements with Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). However, he found that in practice the absence of a SOFA had not caused problems. There
was a satisfactory level of cooperation with the authorities. But it was important that the government extend fo ihe U.N. force, its personnel, property funds and assets, the necessary privileges and immunities
deriving from Article 105(1) of the Charter, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, to which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is a party, and the custom-
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made with Macedonia on March 13, 1995. 6'
The Security Council repeatedly called on the states to conclude
SOFAs. 6' For example, in Resolution 947 it expressed concern that
SOFAs had not been concluded with Croatia, Macedonia or Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and called on them to make such
agreements. 62 The Secretary-General also regretted the difficulties in
securing SOFAs.6
The mere conclusion of a SOFA, however, cannot guarantee cooperation by the host state with the U.N. force. This is clearly illustrated by events in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the conclusion of the
SOFA on May 15, 1993. UNPROFOR was not provided the various
premises it required free of cost, as was called for by the agreement.
Further, the government of Bosnia demanded that the United Nations surrender some facilities it already occupied, pay for other new
facilities, and reopen negotiations on the terms of employment for
local staff. The United Nations was concerned about the taxation of
local employees, their forcible mobilization and detention by government authorities. 6' Thus, while the existence of a SOFA does not
mean cooperation by the host state, the Security Council thought it
worthwhile to press for its conclusion. A SOFA's existence is not
only of symbolic importance as a sign of commitment by the host
state; it also provides specific standards which the U.N. force can inyoke in dealing with the host state. Further, it improves the bargaining position of the U.N. forces in demanding cooperation from
the host state.
The prolonged absence of a SOFA contributed to the difficulties
experienced by UNPROFOR in Croatia. The Secretary-General reported on the difficulties and expenses incurred by UNPROFOR in
Croatia stating that "[w]hile the Croatian authorities were most cooperative and generous during the initial phase of the mission, there
have been recent indications that UNPROFOR's continuing use of
ary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peacekeeping or similar operations.

60. See id.
61. See S.C. Res. 908, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3356th mtg., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/908 (1994)
[hereinafter S/RES/908]; S.C. Res. 947, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3434th mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/947 (1994) (passed unanimously) [hereinafter S/RES/947]; S.C. Res. 981, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess.,
3512th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/981 (1995).
62. SIRES1947,supranote 61, at 2-3.

63. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph4 of the Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. S/1995/38 (1995); Sf1995/222, supra nqte 57, at
16-17.
64. See S/19951222, supranote 57, para. 55.
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Croatian facilities is being approached on a commercial basis."'6
Thus, UNPROFOR was charged $8.6 million in fuel tax for the period July to December 1994 and $2.5 million airport tax in 1994."
Such charges are inconsistent not only with the U.N.'s Model SOFA,
but also with the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations.67 By mid-1995 the Secretary-General had become more openly critical of Croatia's failure to conclude a SOFA
with regard to UNCRO, the force that had replaced UNPROFOR.
He referred to "[d]ifficulties [that] have arisen as a result of demands
by Croatian authorities which are incompatible with the model
status-of-forces agreement."
When Croatia finally concluded an
agreement, the Secretary-General welcomed the signing of the longdelayed SOFA on May 15, 1995 as a positive step that was expected
to reduce obstructions to the functioning of the peacekeeping operation." However, the Secretary-General later reported disappointment:
Although the conclusion of the agreement was welcomed as a positive step, I regret that, at the time of writing, the Government of
Croatia has yet to implement fully various of its provisions such as
making available the necessary premises free of rent and making
arrangements to exempt the United Nations forces and operations
from various taxes and tolls ....Despite repeated requests at various levels, the Government of Croatia has not so far honoured its
commitments in this regard. 7°
IV. SUBSEQUENT CHANGES TO THE INITIAL MANDATE
OF UNPROFOR: IS FURTHER CONSENT NECESSARY?
It is well known that the initial mandate of UNPROFOR was
expanded many times. Over thirty Security Council resolutions directly concerning UNPROFOR were passed out of a total of over
eighty-five resolutions on the Yugoslav conflict. UNPROFOR's
mandate was gradually altered through incremental additions to the
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.ST.
1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
68. Report of the Secretary-GeneralSubmitted Pursuantto Paragraph4 of Security Council Resolution 981 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 9, U.N. Doe. S/1995/320 (1995).
69. 'See S/1995/467, supranote 4, at 5.
70. Report of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1009
(1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 10, U.N. Doe. S/1995/730 (1995).
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original functions, reflecting in part a response to events and the need
for the Security Council to be seen as acting, and in part the absence
of any agreement between members of the Council as to long term
strategy and short term tactics. The issues here are (1) whether the
consent of the host states and of other parties to alterations in the
mandate is legally necessary, and (2) whether this consent was in fact
sought and given to the subsequent changes to UNPROFOR's initial
mandate.
With regard to the issue of principle, no categorical answer is
possible at this stage. Earlier U.N. practice, such as that in the
Congo, does not provide any clear precedent that would cover the
type of situation that arose in the former Yugoslavia. Nevertheless,
given that the host state's consent to the initial mandate has invariably been sought in practice, it could be argued that its consent to subsequent changes is also necessary. Even if this is not already a legal
requirement, the government of the host state retains ultimate control through its power to withdraw consent to the presence of the
peacekeeping force on its territory.7 ' However, the situation with regard to the consent of the host state to changes in the initial mandate
changes when the alterations are made under Chapter VII of the
Charter.'
With regard to the issue of whether consent to the subsequent
changes in UNPROFOR's mandate was actually sought and given in
the former Yugoslavia, the answer is complex. Some of the resolutions altering the mandate do expressly refer to consent by all the
concerned parties. Resolution 762 contains an apparent reference to
consent when it gives UNPROFOR a new role in monitoring Serboccupied zones (the so-called pink zones) outside the U.N.-protected
areas in Croatia-it states that UNPROFOR is to carry out its functions "with the agreement of the government of Croatia and others
concerned."' Again, in Resolution 781, establishing the no-fly zone
over Bosnia-Herzegovina,7' the Security Council recalls the Agreement arrived at between the interested parties at the London Conference to establish such a zone, noting as well the letter by BosniaHerzegovina to the Security Council calling for the enforcement of
)

71. SeeinfraPartVIL
72. See infra Part V.
73. S.C. Res. 762, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3088th mtg., para. 7, U.N. Doe. S/RES/762 (1992)
(passed unanimously).
74. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg., U.N. Doe.S/RES/781 (1992).
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the no-fly zone agreed to at the London Conference. ' Other resolutions altering UNPROFOR's mandate refer specifically to government consent. Thus, Resolution 824 on the establishment of safe areas takes into consideration "the formal request submitted by
Bosnia-Herzegovina" with regard to Zepa.7 6 This request stated, "we
suggest the Security Council declare... Zepa as a United Nations
protected area and send a company of blue helmets to defend this
area and the civilian population there."'
Except for these resolutions, the many resolutions expanding
UNPROFOR's mandate do so without any express reference to consent. '8 These expansions led to problems with consent of the parties.
As the Secretary-General said in the Supplement to the Agenda for
Peace:
Three aspects of recent mandates, in particular, have led
peacekeeping operations to forfeit the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was perceived to be partial or to use force other
than in self-defence. These were the task of protecting humanitarian operations during fighting, the protection of civilian populations
in safe areas, pressing parties to accept national reconciliation at a
pace faster than they were ready to accept. In Bosnia, as in Somalia, the Security Council gave existing peacekeeping operations ad75. See Letter Dated2 November 1992 From the PermanentRepresentative of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the UnitedNations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
U.N. Doe. S/24750 (1992); Letter Dated23 October 1992 From the PermanentRepresentativeof Bosnia
and Hercegovinato the UnitedNations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/24709 (1992); Letter Dated 5 October 1992 From the PermanentRepresentative
of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/24616 (1992).
76. S.C. Res. 824, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3208th mtg., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/824 (1993) (passed
unanimously).
77. LetterDated4 May 1993 From the PermanentRepresentativeof Bosnia and Hercegovinato the
United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 2,
U.N. Doe. S/25718 (1993); see also LetterDated 31 October 1992 Fromthe PermanentRepresentativeof
Bosnia and Hercegovina to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 47th
Seas., U.N. Doe. S/24749 (1992).
78. See S.C. Res. 815, U.N. SCOR, 48th Seas., 3189th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/815 (1993)
[hereinafter S/RES/815]; S.C. Res. 807, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3174th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/807
(1993) [hereinafter S/RES/807]; S.C. Res. 802, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3163d mtg., U.N. S/RES/802
(1993); S.C. Res. 779, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3118th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/779 (1992); S.C. Res. 776,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/776 (1992) [hereinafter S/RES/776]; S.C. Res.
769, U.N. SCOR, 47th Seas., 3104th mtg., U.N. Doe. S1RES1769 (1992). In fact, some of these resolutions
were passed with the consent of the host-state government. For example, Resolution 769 allowing
UNPROFOR to operate immigration controls in the U.N.-protected areas was passed after Croatia had expressed support for it. LetterDated 7August 1992from the Charg6d'Affaires A.L of the PermanentMission of Croatiato the United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
47th Seas., U.N. Doe.Sf24390 (1992).
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ditional mandates requiring the use of force and therefore they
could not be combined with existing mandates requiritig the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force. 79-

Because the peacekeeping forces were authorized to go beyond
limited monitoring of a ceasefire, and because they were authorized
to use force to carry out their mandate, there was an obvious possibility that they would become involved in conflict with the various
parties, including the host state government. Although the force was
originally established on the basis of host-state consent, the extension
of its mandate meant that it could no longer rely on that consent to
its operations. This leads to a discussion of the use by the Security
Council of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
V. BLURRING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
PEACEKEEPING AND ENFORCEMENT ACTION: THE USE
OF CHAPTER VII OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR HOST-STATE CONSENT
UNPROFOR was beset by operational difficulties from the start
of its operations. At the least, UNPROFOR met with noncooperation and interference with its freedom of movement. This escalated to offensives across UNPROFOR positions in violation of the
U.N. peacekeeping plan in Croatia and of local ceasefires in Bosnia,
and to attacks on U.N. forces and hostage taking. All the parties
were responsible for this non-cooperation.
Partly in response to
these difficulties, the Security Council not only authorized member
states to use force under Chapter VII to secure the implementation
of its resolutions,81 but also turned to Chapter VII in its resolutions
79. Supplement to an Agendafor Peace: PositionPaperof the Secretary-Generalon the Occasion
of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., paras. 34-35, U.N. Doe.

S1199511 (1995).
80. See S11995/222, supra note 57; Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph4 of
Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doe. S1 995/38 (1995); Report of
the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security CouncilResolution 908 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N.
Doe. S/1994/1067 (1994); Letter Dated26 July 1994 From the Secretary-GeneralAddressedto the Presi-

dent of the Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1994/888 (1994); Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Resolution 871 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. Sf1994/300 (1994);
Report ofthe Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 815 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th

Sess., U.N. Doe. Sf25777 (1993); Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 762 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/24353 (1992); S/23900, supra note 31; S/23844,

supra note 56; See Brown, supra note I (providing a rather one-sided account); see generally Charles G.
Boyd, Making Peacewith the Guilty: The Truth aboutBosnia, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1995).

81. See S.C. Res. 958, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3461st mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/958 (1994);
S/RES/908, supra note 61; S.C. Res. 836, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3228th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/836
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on UNPROFOR. Chapter VII empowers the Security Council to
make decisions authorizing enforcement action by member states or
by U.N. forces, and these decisions are binding on all member states.
Thus, although UNPROFOR was originally established as a
peacekeeping force whose deployment depended on the consent of
the host state, the Security Council subsequently turned to Chapter
VII in order to impose binding obligations on member states, including the host state, to comply with its resolutions and to cooperate
with the peacekeeping force.
The first sixteen resolutions on UNPROFOR made no reference
to Chapter VII; such reference was rare in the context of
peacekeeping operations.' The institution of peacekeeping developed outside the context of Chapter VII and indeed outside the formal framework of the U.N. Charter through the practice of the U.N.
and its member states. Peacekeeping traditionally operated by hoststate consent and with the cooperation of all concerned parties; it
typically involved lightly armed forces which were impartial and
which used force only in self-defense?
In the early days of the Yugoslav conflict, the Security Council
made express reference to Chapter VII only in its resolutions on
sanctions' and then in Resolution 770 authorizing member states to
use force to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid by the United
Nations. China abstained in: the vote on this resolution and in the
vote on Resolution 776 which authorized UNPROFOR to use force
to secure the delivery of humanitarian aid." It did this precisely be(1993) [hereinafter S/RES/836]; S.C. Res. 816, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doe.
S/RES/816 (1993); S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg,, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (1992);
S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/770 (1992) [hereinafter
S/RES7n70].
82. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.N. observer team created to monitor the ceasefire was established under Resolution 598, which passed under Chapter VII. S.C. Res. 598, U.N. SCOR, 42d Ses.,
2750th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/598 (1987). Similarly, the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), the observer mission established at the end of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, was created by
Resolution 689, which passed under Chapter VII. S.C. Res. 689, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2983d mtg.,
U.N. Doec. S/RES/689 (1991).
83. See generally HIGGINs, supranote 1; WHrrE, supranote 1.
84. These early resolutions on sanctions were: S.C. Res. 760, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3086th mtg.,
U.N. Doe. S/RES1760 (1992); S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg., U.N. Do. S/RES/757
(1992); S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3023d mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/724 (1991); S.C. Res. 713,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/713 (1991).
85. S/RES/770, supra note 81 (twelve members voting in favor;, China, India and Zimbabwe abstaining).
86. S/RES/776, supra note 78 (twelve members voting in favor;, China, India and Zimbabwe abstaining).
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cause of the invocation of Chapter VII. China said that it opposed
the use of Chapter VII in Resolution 770 and it sought a diplomatic
solution to the conflict. Although Resolution 776 did not itself refer
to Chapter VII, it did refer to Resolution 770, thereby linking
UNPROFOR to Chapter VII. According to China, this changed the
nature of the peacekeeping force:
The resolution just adopted by the Security Council aims at enlarging the mandate of UNPROFOR in an effort to provide military support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to BosniaHerzegovina. In principle, the Chinese delegation does not object
to the strengthening of humanitarian-assistance activities, but the
resolution at issue established a link between the enlargement of
the mandate of UNPROFOR and the implementation of Security
Council resolution 770 (1992). This is something we cannot accept.
It is a well-known fact the the Chinese delegation abstained in the
vote on resolution 770 (1992), which authorizes countries to use
force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we cannot endorse any
actions related to the implementation of this resolution. At the
same time, we believe that UNPROFOR should, as a United Nations peacekeeping operation, follow the generally recognized
guidelines established in past United Nations peacekeeping operations in implementing its mandate.
However, in this resolution, which provides for the new mandate of
UNPROFOR, there are disturbing elements which depart from
these guidelines. It must be noted that Security Council Resolution
770 (1992) is a mandatory action taken under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter. We are concerned that linking this resolution with resolution 770 (1992) will change the non-mandatory nature of UNPROFOR as the United Nations peacekeeping operation.
On the one hand, this resolution recognizes that
UNPROFOR should observe the normal rules of engagement of
United Nations peacekeeping operation in implementing its new
mandate, namely to use force only in self-defence. On the other
hand, the resolution approves the use of force in self-defence when
troops are blocked by armed force. We are concerned that
UNPROFOR will run the risk of plunging into armed conflict., 7
China also was not happy that mandate enlargement of
UNPROFOR had not received the express consent of the parties
concerned in Bosnia-Herzegovina.'
From February 1993 the Security Council began expressly using
87. Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Fourteenth Meeting,
U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3114th mtg., at 11-12, U.N. Doe. S/PV.3114 (1992).
88. See id.at 12.
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Chapter VII as the basis for its resolutions on UNPROFOR. It did
this for the first time in Resolution 807."9 In the debate leading to this
resolution's adoption, only France and China expressly discussed the
reference to Chapter VIIVO France regretted that UNPROFOR's
mandate was being extended for only six weeks:
But even for a brief interim period, it was unthinkable to us that we
extend the present mandate in its current form. It was in that spirit
that my delegation proposed a substantive and ambitious draft
resolution that places UNPROFOR within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter and suggested a series of concrete measures
aimed at ensuring greater stability in the areas where UNPROFOR
is deployed. As to the reference to Chapter VII, I reiterate once
again that our idea is not to change the nature of the force, that is
to move from peacekeeping to peacemaking. We are moved solely
by considerations of preventive security. Indeed, this is reflected in
the text of the draft resolution before us.91

The resolution made it clear that the invocation of Chapter VII
was motivated by the need to secure the protection of UNPROFOR.
The relevant parts provide:
Deeply concerned by the lack of cooperation of the parties and others concerned in implementing the United Nations peacekeeping
plan in Croatia (S123280, Annex III),
Deeply concerned also by the recent and repeated violations by the
parties and others concerned of their cease-fire obligations,
Determining that the situation thus created constitutes a threat to
peace and security in the region ....
Determined to ensure the security of UNPROFOR and to this end,
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations ....

China supported the resolution, although it expressed some reservation about the invocation of Chapter VII. China shared the concern regarding the security of UNPROFOR and would vote in favor
"considering that the sponsor country has repeatedly stated that the
purpose of invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in
this draft resolution is to take measures to increase appropriately

89. S/RES/807, supranote 78 (passed unanimously).
90. See Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand One Hundred and Seventy-Fourth
Meeting, U.N. SCOR,48th Sess., 3174th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3174 (1993) [hereinafter S/PV.3174].
91. Id.at 14-15 (comments of Mr. Mrim~e, France).
92. S/RES/807, supranote 78.
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UNPROFOR's self defence capability."" However, China pointed
out that UNPROFOR was a peacekeeping operation and that Chapter VII was not invoked in Resolution 743 establishing UNPROFOR
or subsequent resolutions. Nor had the current report of the Secretary-General requested any reference to Chapter VII. "With regard
to the safety of UNPROFOR personnel, the question could be settled through the expanded concept of self-defense and by taking
other appropriate measures without invoking Chapter VII . .. ."
"We should therefore like to put on record the understanding that
the practice of invoking Chapter VII in this draft resolution is an exceptional case and therefore does not constitute a precedent for future U.N. peacekeeping operations." '
Having invoked Chapter VII, Resolution 807 then
1. Demands that the parties and others concerned comply fully
with the United Nations peacekeeping plan in Croatia and
with the other commitments they have undertaken and in particular with their cease-fire obligations;
2. Demands further that the parties and others concerned refrain from positioning their forces in the proximity of
UNPROFOR's units in the United Nations Protected Areas
(UNPAs) and in the pink zones;
3. Demands also the full and strict observance of all relevant
Security Council resolutions relating to the mandate and operations of UNPROFOR in the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina;
4. Demands also that the parties and others concerned respect
fully UNPROFOR's unimpeded freedom of movement, enabling it inter alia to carry out all necessary concentrations and
deployments, all movements of equipment and weapons and
all humanitarian and logistical activities. 95
Thus, the resolution imposes binding duties on the parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR in its performance of its mandate. Even
absent any reference to Chapter VII, there is such a duty on the host
state based on its consent to the establishment and deployment of the
peacekeeping force. Chapter VII simply strengthens this duty. The
reference to Chapter VII does not by itself give UNPROFOR any
extra powers, nor does it amount to a blanket authorization to use

93. S/PV.3174, supranote 90, at 21 (Mr. Chen Jian, China).

94. Id.
95. S/RES/807, supranote 78, at 1,2.
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force as some writers have mistakenly asserted. 6 UNPROFOR's
powers to use force depend on express provision in Security Council
resolutions such as Resolution 776 on humanitarian aid and Resolution 836 on safe areas, and on its inherent right to use force in selfdefense.
Almost all the subsequent resolutions on UNPROFOR follow
Resolution 807 in invoking Chapter VII ' In fact, the Security Council, having once invoked Chapter VII, found itself almost trapped
into continuing to make such references. France acknowledged this
in the Security Council debate on Security Council Resolution 900"8
on the restoration of normal life in Sarajevo:
I should like to stress, moreover, that we have adopted this resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as the
other resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina have been since
August 1992. In this context, not to have resorted to Chapter VII
would for the parties have been the worst of signals, at the very
time when the international community has just successfully demonstrated its determination to bring about a halt to the bombing of
Sarajevo. Beyond that, application of Chapter VII, which does not
imply an automatic resorting to force, will give UNPROFOR the
authority it needs to surmount the obstacles
that might be placed in
99
the way of the execution of its mandate.

China
again expressed reservations about the invocation of Chapter
10 0

VI.

Although this series of resolutions imposed binding obligations
not only on states but also on all the parties to the conflict, cooperation with UNPROFOR did not improve. UNPROFOR continued to
be obstructed by all sides; its convoys were impeded, its forces were
taken hostage, and the safe areas where U.N. troops were posted
were subject to attack. ' In response to these difficulties facing
96. See Paul C. Szasz, Peacekeepingin Operation:A Conflict Study of Bosnia, 28 CORNELL INT'L
LU.685, 696-697 (1995).

97. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 871, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3286th ntg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/871 (1993);
S.C. Res. 870, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3285th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/870 (1993); S.C. Res. 869, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3284th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/869 (1993); S.C. Res. 859, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,

3269th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/859 (1993); S.C. Res. 847, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3248th mntg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/847 (1993); S.C. Res. 844, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3241st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/844
(1993); S/RES/836, supranote 81; S/RES/815, supranote 78.

98. S.C. Res. 900, U.N. SCOR, 50th Seas., 3527th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/900 (1995).
99. U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3344th mtg., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3344 (1994).
100. Seeid.at ll.

101. See, e.g., U.N. CHRON., Sept. 95, at 29-32; U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1994, at 27, 29, 30; U.N.
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UNPROFOR, the Rapid Reaction Force was created.
VI. THE CREATION OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE
Further problems with consent arose with the creation of the
Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) in June 1995. States were divided as to
the nature of the force; as to whether it was a peacekeeping force
whose establishment was based on host-state consent or an enforcement force established without the need for host-state consent; and
whether it was intended to be impartial or operate against one of the
parties involved in the conflict.' In fact, the RRF was not given any
powers beyond those of UNPROFOR. Additionally, the establishment of the RRF led to further problems over the conclusion of SOFAs with the host states. The host states argued that the RRF was a
new force separate from UNPROFOR and demanded the negotiation of a new SOFA. 3 The Security Council justifiably rejected this
claim.'"
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom proposed the
establishment of the RRF to provide military relief for UNPROFOR
to reduce the vulnerability of its personnel and to enhance its capacity to carry out its existing mandate. 5 The RRF was to be a wellarmed, mobile force and to operate under the existing mandate and
rules of engagement of UNPROFOR. When the Security Council
discussed the proposal for an RRF, divisions between member states
were apparent."' China argued that the force would constitute a de
facto change in the peacekeeping status of UNPROFOR. It said that
the force was being established for enforcement action and thus
UNPROFOR would become a party to the conflict.0 7 Russia also
said that the resolution did not avoid the impression that the RRF
was intended to operate against one party to the conflict, the Bosnian
Serbs. 0 ' But the United Kingdom and France insisted that no change

CHRON., Sept. 1994, at 29; U.N. CHRON., June 1994, at 26; U.N. CHRON., March 1994, at 64; U.N.

CHRON., Dec. 1993, at 32; U.N. CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 17, 19; see also 1993 U.N.Y.B. 487, 489;
1994 U.N.Y.B. 488, 491,513.
102. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
103. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
104. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
105. See Letter Dated 9 June 1995 From the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Presidentof the

Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/470 (1995).
106. See U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3543d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3543 (1995) [hereinafter S/PV.3543].
107. See id. at 13-14.
108. See id.
at 10.
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in the nature of UNPROFOR was intended. ' °o The United States offered limited support, stating "[w]e vote in favour of this draft on the
clear understanding that by doing so we are not incurring any direct
financial obligation.""11 Accordingly, the resolution establishing the
force was passed by 13-0-2 (China and Russia voting against)."' The
welresolution specifically noted a letter from Bosnia-Herzegovina
2
coming the reinforcement of UNPROFOR.1
Serious problems arose regarding the attitude of the host states,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina had expressed its consent to the establishment and deployment of the force
during the Security Council debate."' Croatia had been rather less
forthcoming at that stage, but did say that it would consent on the basis that the force would operate in Bosnia alone and that it would station only command and logistic facilities in Croatia. Any operational
use of the RRF in Croatia could only proceed after consultation with
the government of Croatia and with its approval and consent."4 Both
states subsequently wrote to the Security Council promising to cooperate with the force."5
However, both states were determined that the RRF would operate in such a way as to support their own particular aims. They
now demanded new SOFAs, claiming that existing agreements did
not cover the RRF as it was not part of UNPROFOR. They wanted
to impose new restrictions on the RRF limiting its freedom of movement. They also wanted to impose less favorable terms than the existing SOFAs with regard to use of premises and payment for services."6 The Secretary-General rejected these claims. He said that the

109. See id. at 18-19.
110. Id. at 16-17.
111. S.C. Res. 998, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3543d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/RES/998 (1995).
112. See Letter Dated 14 June 1995 From the Chargi d'Affaires A.I. of the PermanentMission of
Bosnia and Hercegovinato the UnitedNations Addressed to the Presidentofthe Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/1995/483 (1995).
113. See S/PV.3543, supranote 106, at 3.
114. See id. at 7.
115. See LetterDated 14 August 1995 From the Charghd'Affaires A.. of the PermanentMission of
Bosnia and Hercegovinato the United NationsAddressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/691 (1995); LetterDated11 August 1995 From the PermanentRepresentative of Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/684 (1995).
116. See Letter Dated 17 August 1995 From the Secretary-GeneralAddressed to the Presidentof the
Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/19951707 (1995) [hereinafter S/1995/707]. Also,
the Croats in Bosnia demanded a separate SOFA with the Federation established under the framework
agreement creating a Federation in the Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina with a majority
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RRF was part of UNPROFOR and therefore covered by the existing

SOFAs; SOFAs naturally covered variations in size of peacekeeping
forces.
On the ground, both states obstructed the RRF's deployment of
troops. In July 1995, the Secretary-General reported on these problems to the Security Council.117 In response, the Council issued a
statement:
The Security Council is deeply concerned at the implication of the
continued impediments to the functioning of the RRF for the effectiveness of the United Nations mission in the Republic of BosniaHerzegovina. It calls upon the Government of the Republic of
Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately to
remove all impediments and to give clear undertakings concerning
the freedom of movement and provision of facilities for the RRF, in
order that it may perform its tasks without further delay. It further
calls upon them to resolve forthwith within the framework of the
existing SOFAs any outstanding difficulties with the relevant
United Nations authorities. 8
This episode illustrates Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia attempting to take advantage of the creation of the RRF to secure the
negotiation of SOFAs more favorable to them, that is, SOFAs which
would offer them greater control over the operations of
UNPROFOR on their territories. Although both states formally
consented to the deployment of the RRF, they did not fulfil their duties to cooperate with it on the ground.
VII. CROATIA'S WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT FROM
UNPROFOR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNCRO
The termination of Croatia's consent to the presence of
UNPROFOR on its territory shows clearly that it was the consent of
the host-state government that was essential for the continued deployment of the U.N. force. Croatia used this power to secure the
removal of UNPROFOR and the creation of a new peacekeeping
force with a mandate more acceptable to it. In so doing, Croatia
jeopardized the hopes of peaceful settlement and the entire
Bosnian and Croatian population. See Letter Dated 3 March 1994 From the PermanentRepresentatives
ofBosnia and Hercegovina and Croatia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N.

SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1994/255 (1994).
117. S11995/707,supranote 116.
118. Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3568th rntg., para. 4,
U.N. Doe. S/PRST/1995/40 (1995).
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peacekeeping operation.
Even at the time UNPROFOR was created, Croatia expressed
reservations in giving its consent.'19 Croatia was concerned with
maintaining its sovereignty over the U.N.-protected areas, and
keeping the U.N. peace plan from perpetuating the division of Croatia. From June 1993 Croatia expressed reservations about the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate, 20 and the Security Council from
this time regularly called on the Secretary-General to report on the
reconsideration of the mandate "taking into account the position of
the Government of Croatia.' ' . The Secretary-General regularly reported that UNPROFOR played an indispensable role in Croatia;
even if it was not able fully to carry out its mandate, it helped to prevent the renewal of conflict.' Croatia also indicated concern about
the name of UNPROFOR. It called for a new name from which it
would be prima facie evident that the peacekeeping force was located
on the territory of Croatia."
Finally, in January 1995, Croatia formally gave notice of the
withdrawal of its consent to the deployment of UNPROFOR on its
territory. 24 The Security Council interpreted this to mean that

119. See S/1995/467, supra note 4, at 5.
120. See, e.g., LeterDated26 September 1994 From the PermanentRepresentativeof Croatiato the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc.
Sf1994/1095 (1994); LetterDated 16 March 1993 From the Charged'AffairesA.I. of the PermanentMission of Croatia to the UnitedNations Addressed to the Secretary-GeneralU.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/305 (1994); Letter Dated 24 September 1993 From the Permanent Representativeof
Croatiato the United NationsAddressed to the Presidentofthe Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex, U.N. Doc. Sf26491 (1993); Letter Dated 30 July 1993 From the Permanent Representative of
Croatiato the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N.
Doe. S/26220 (1993) [hereinafter S26220]; Letter Dated 25 June 1993from the PermanentRepresentative ofCroatia to the UnitedNationsAddressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doe. S/26002 (1993).
121. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 847, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/847 (1993) (passed unanimously).
122. See, eg., Reportof the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 847 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., paras. 2-5, U.N. Doe. S/26310 (1993); FurtherReport to the
Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security CouncilResolution 815 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., paras. 34, U.N. Doe. S/25993 (1993); FurtherReport to the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Security Council
Resolution 743 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., para. 15, U.N. Doe. S/26470 (1993).
123. See Sf26220, supranote 120, at 1. A similar debate about the name of the peacekeeping force
had arisen earlier regarding UNDOF.
124. See LetterDated 12 January1995 From the PermanentRepresentativeof Croatiato the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doe. Sf1995/28 (1995);
Letter Dated18 January1995 From the PermanentRepresentative of Croatiato the United Nations Addressed to the President ofthe Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doe. S/1995/56
(1995).
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UNPROFOR would have to be withdrawn, that is, despite the many
resolutions referring to Chapter VII, the presence of UNPROFOR in
Croatia still depended on the consent of the host state. The Secretary-General expressed regret at the withdrawal of consent and said
that there was a serious risk of renewed hostilities if UNPROFOR
withdrew. He hoped that the Croatian government would reconsider
its position before the expiry of UNPROFOR's current mandate.12
In a later report of March 1995 the Secretary-General said that there
had indeed been a significant escalation of military activity and tension. There was an increased lack of cooperation with UNPROFOR
and both sides had made tactical deployment of their forces in prepa-1
s
ration for wide-scale conflict after the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.2
The Security Council also expressed grave concern about the risk of
renewed hostilities and called for negotiations to secure the continued presence of a peacekeeping force.2'
President Tudjman then relented and agreed to the continued
presence of a smaller peacekeeping force with a new mandate and a
new name. UNPROFOR was to be divided into three forces, with
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia continuing as before.'2s
In Croatia, substantial alterations were made to the mandate. There
were detailed discussions between the United Nations and both the
Government of Croatia and the Croatian Serbs over the nature, size
and functions of the force. 29 As to the name, President Tudjman said
in letters to the Security Council that if the resolution did not allow
the official name of the operation to be the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), Croatia would
not give its consent for the establishment of the new force."3 During

125. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph4 of Security Council Resolution
947 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., para. 31, U.N. Doe. S/1995/38 (1995) [hereinafter S/1995/38].

126. See U.N. Doe. S/1995/222, supranote 57, paras. 3-5.
127. See Statement by the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3491st rntg.,
U.N. Doe. S/PRST/1995/2 (1995).
128. See Letter Dated 17 March 1995 From the PermanentRepresentative of Croatiato the United

Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doe. S/1995/206
(1995). Resolution 982 noted Bosnia's consent expressed in the Letter Dated 29 March 1995 From the
Permanent Representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-

General, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/245 (1995). Resolution 983, on the force in Macedonia,
does not contain any express reference to consent. S. C. Res. 983, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doe.
S/RES/983 (1995).
129. See S/19951222, supranote 57; Yugoslav Crisis,A Climate of Uncertainty,U.N. CHRON., June

1995, at 24-26.
130. See S/26220, supranote 120; Letter Dated 30 March 1995 From the PermanentRepresentative
of Croatiato the United NationsAddressed to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th
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the Security Council debate leading to the resolution, Croatia
claimed that this name implied that the operation was not merely a
static peacekeeping force but an active, task-specific operation."'
The Krajina Serb Assembly subsequently criticised the name
UNCRO, saying that it prejudged a political solution and ignored the
sovereign rights of the Serbs in Krajina."2
The new force was to support and facilitate the implementation
of the March 1994 cease-fire and the December 1994 economic
agreement between the parties in Croatia, to assist in controlling
military crossing of the borders of Croatia, to help the delivery of
humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to monitor the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula. 3 But the Secretary-General reported that the plan for the deployment of UNCRO did not have the
full acceptance of the Croatian Government or of the Serb local
authorities:
As was to some degree the case in February 1992 when
UNPROFOR was originally established, the plan set out above
does not have the full acceptance and full support of either the
Government of Croatia or the local Serb authorities. The risk
therefore remains that either or both sides will fail to cooperate
with the U.N. in its implementation. In these circumstances it is not
without misgivings that I present these proposals to the Council.
On the other hand, the plan provides for the pragmatic implementation of Security Council Resolution 981 and the alternative to its

adoption would be withdrawal of the U.N. forces and the resumption of war.L"
The Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council
authorize the deployment of UNCRO. He set out the proposed
composition of the force (and of the forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Macedonia) in his report to the Security Council. 35
Again Croatia proved reluctant to conclude a SOFA. It had
Sess., Annex, U.N. Doe. S!1995/246 (1995).
131. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph4 of Security Council Resolution
947 (1994), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3512th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3512 (1995).
132. See S/1995/467, supranote 4, para. 18.
133. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralSubmitted Pursuant to Paragraph4 of Security Council
Resolution 981 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., paras. 11-28, U.N. Doc. S/1995/320 (1995) [hereinafter
S/1995/320].
134. Id. Subsequently, Croatia expressly accepted the principles in the mandate of UNCRO. See Letter Dated28 April 1995 Fromthe PermanentRepresentative of Croatia to the UnitedNations Addressed
to the Presidentof the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/339 (1995).
135. S/1995/222, supra note 57, paras. 3-5; Letter Dated 5 May 1995 From the Secretary General
Addressed to the Presidentof the Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1995/386 (1995).
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never finalized a SOFA for UNPROFOR despite a pledge given by
President Tudjman in September 1994.1" Negotiations on a SOFA
for UNCRO progressed very slowly.1 The Security Council, in the
resolution establishing UNCRO, had stressed the need for a SOFA,
and Resolution 990 also expressed concern that a SOFA had not
been signed and called on Croatia to conclude an agreement."l The
Secretary-General also reported on the difficulties that had arisen as
a result of demands by Croatian authorities incompatible with the
U.N. model SOFA.'" It was only after an offensive by Croatian government forces in May 1995 that Croatia finally concluded a SOFA
on 15 May 1995.' 4
On the political level the Krajina Serbs accepted the deployment
of UNCRO, but the Secretary-General reported a lack of cooperation on the ground and the occurrence of hijackings and robbery of
UNCRO forces.1 2 The Croatian government overran UNCRO positions in offensives of May and August 1995.43 After the first May offensive, both sides asked UNCRO to stay and complete its deployment, but the Secretary-General said that "more than words are
required to justify the continuation of this expensive and dangerous
mission."1" Nevertheless UNCRO was deployed in a modified form.
Later, in the fourth August offensive the Croatian government drove
UNCRO out of all the U.N.-protected areas except Sector East and
UNCRO subsequently remained only in Eastern Slavonia in a much
reduced form. 45

136. See S11995138,supra note 125.

137. See Sl19951320, supra note 133.
138. S.C. Res. 981, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/RES/981 (1995) (passed unanimously).
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142. See id.
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CouncilResolution 1009 (1995), U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doe. S/1995/730 (1995); Letter Dated 7
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CONCLUSION
The early problems in securing the consent of "the concerned
parties" to the deployment of UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia were ominous, and the Secretary-General's fears that the force would not be
able to operate effectively without the cooperation of all those involved proved prophetic. The initial consent to the establishment of
UNPROFOR was grudgingly given by some of the parties, and the
formal consent of the host-state governments, even though accompanied by consent to the details of the initial mandate of UNPROFOR,
was not sufficient to guarantee cooperation. The lack of-active support for UNPROFOR on the ground was made manifest when hoststate governments were reluctant to conclude SOFAs to protect the
forces' rights and freedom of movement.
The subsequent expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate demonstrated uncertainties as to the law on consent, and led to conflict between the warring parties and UNPROFOR when the parties came
to see UNPROFOR as an obstacle to the achievement of their military goals. Even though the Security Council eventually resorted to
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in order to stress the binding nature
of the duty to cooperate with UNPROFOR and to secure the protection of UNPROFOR troops, this did not lead to increased cooperation on the ground. When the Security Council tried to increase the
UNPROFOR's effectiveness by creating a Rapid Reaction Force, the
host-state governments sought to take advantage of this and to negotiate SOFAs which would give them greater control over the operations of UNPROFOR. Croatia finally withdrew its consent to the
deployment of UNPROFOR in its territory and consented to its replacement by UNCRO only on its own restrictive terms.
This sequence of events not only shows the practical problems
encountered by the U.N. peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia with regard to consent, it also vividly illustrates the complexity and multifaceted nature of the concept of consent in the context of
peacekeeping.

